Normativity and Innovation : An Approach to Concepts of Innovation from the Perspective of Philosophy of Technology by Schmidt, Jan Cornelius
Working Paper Series 
Working Paper #31 
Normativity and Innovation
An Approach to Concepts of Innovation from the Perspective of Philosophy of Technology
Jan C. Schmidt
January 2008
Georgia Institute of Technology
D. M. Smith Building
Room 107
685 Cherry Street
Atlanta, GA 30332 - 0345
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Scholarly Materials And Research @ Georgia Tech
Normativity and Innovation 
An Approach to Concepts of Innovation from the Perspective of Philosophy of Technology
Jan Cornelius Schmidt
Georgia Institute of Technology
School of Public Policy
685 Cherry Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30332, U.S.A.
Abstract – The aim of this short paper is to sketch an analytic
approach to innovation from the perspective of philosophy of
technology. Until now, philosophers have been reluctant to ad-
dress issues of innovation—even though both innovation re-
search and philosophy of technology share the same object of
study: the intersection of science, technology, and society. In this
paper I will reveal normative assumptions in innovation re-
search. I identify normativity in four areas: (1) theory of society
and innovation, (2) objects of innovation (artifacts, processes,
knowledge, problems), (3) process of innovation, and (4) ethics
and innovation. This paper presents an outline for a research
program and a catalog of questions—and not a net argumenta-
tion or final answers. The aim is to attract philosophical interest
and to stimulate interdisciplinary collaboration between social
scientists and philosophers.
A POLITICAL TERM ...
Buzzwords determine science, technology, and innovation
politics: they shape the future trajectories of research and
development. Most dominant are terms such as “interdiscipli-
narity” and “innovation”. In this paper I focus on the latter.
My thesis is that “innovation” should be characterized as an
eminently political term. The term can be regarded as a cog-
nitive boundary object located in a transfer zone between
academia (different types of natural, engineering and social
sciences) and politics (at the federal, state, regional or local
level or of firms/corporations)—a minefield of different in-
terests, claims and considerations. That makes a mere de-
scriptive approach impossible. What innovation is cannot be
separated from what it should be. The term is descriptive and
normative at the same time. 
In spite of its prevalence, normativity is rarely explicitly con-
sidered by innovation researchers.  Most empirical research-
ers in the field of innovation (and of sciences and technology
studies, STS) regard their approaches mainly as descriptive,
quantitative and explanatory. This is, indeed, a shortcoming.
Normativity has not always received the scholarly attention it
deserves. 
Normativity is and has always been present in research of the
intersection of science, technology and society. We cannot
abandon normative assumptions, hidden convictions and im-
plicit goals but—by means of critical argumentation and ra-
tional justification—we can contribute to societal discourses
in order to find adequate goals for shaping innovation proc-
esses towards our common future. If we do not make norma-
tivity (normative assumptions, implicit goals) explicit it can
easily convert to metaphysics and ideology. The aim of this
paper is to advocate critical and reflexive innovation research
in order to assess, to reflect on and to revise goals, ends, and
objective. Such a kind of a renewed innovation research
shares many well-known procedures with prospective tech-
nology assessment (PTA). Bridging the gap between empiri-
cal research and reflection on/revision of normativity will
also be beneficial for engineering ethics.
In order to stimulate critical and reflexive innovation research
I will address the underlying normative assumptions of “in-
novation”. I find normativity in four areas: (1) innovation and
theory of society, (2) objects of innovation (artifacts, proc-
esses, knowledge, problems), (3) process of innovation, and
(4) innovation and ethics. I argue in favor of the priority of
normative reflection.
1. SOCIETY 
How should one understand innovation in society? Innova-
tion theories—this is my thesis—are always interlaced with
theories of society. If we argue for this thesis, we are faced
with a problem. It is hard to identify the exact origin and the
core content of innovation theories. The date and place of
birth of innovation theories depend quite considerably on
what underlies one’s understanding of innovation. The me-
dium-range history of innovation theories traces back to Jo-
seph Schumpeter in the 1930s / 1940s—in particular to his
“Theory of Economic Development” and “Capitalism, So-
cialism and Democracy” in which he explicitly focuses on
“creative destruction” as a source of innovation. From a
short-range historical perspective the initial point of innova-
tion research is no doubt Christopher Freeman’s work on
“The Economics of Industrial Innovation” and the foundation
of the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sus-
sex, UK. Early contributions are sometimes identified in the
works of Francis Bacon, Adam Smith and Karl Marx. 
The unifying arch is that innovation is regarded as the central
source and driving force for the further development of mod
ern (and late-modern) societies. Although some differences to
classical modernization theories can be found, all (late-
modern) concepts of innovation (still) associate technological
advancement with societal progress: without innovation, no
progress!i For instance, according to Jan Fagerberg, “innova-
tion is as old as mankind itself. There seems to be something
inherently ‘human’ about the tendency to think about new
and better ways of doing things and to try them out in prac-
tice. Without it, the world in which we live would look very,
very different. Try for a moment to think of a world without
airplanes, automobiles, telecommunications, and refrigera-
tors, just to mention a few of the more important innovations
from the not-too-distant past. Or—from an even longer per-
spective—where would we be without such fundamental in-
novations as agriculture, the wheel, or printing?” [1]
After the debates in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s on side ef-
fects, long-term impacts, and risks caused by technological
development (Silent Spring, Hole in the Ozone Layer, Three
Mile Island, Chernobyl), Fagerberg’s one-sided positive in-
terpretation is surprising. However, most innovation re-
searchers share Fagerberg’s technoscientific optimism for
society. Innovation means an “improvement” and a “prog-
ress” for society in general (and further, an “enhancement of
human performance” [2]). “Innovation is crucial for long-
term economic growth.” [3] In addition, many innovation
theorists proceed to regard market mechanisms, consumer
demands and customer desires as the driving forces behind
“new” and “better” products and processes. According to
Afuah, “innovation is the use of new knowledge to offer a
new product or service that customers want. It is invention
and commercialization.” [4] The market, and in particular the
customer or the state (by regulating market mechanisms),
seems to determine what innovation is. This view is not only
close to the classic linear chain-based pull theory of innova-
tion. It fits well with both a liberal/neo-liberal (Adam Smith,
Milton Friedman) and, with slight modifications, an interven-
tionist approach (John M. Keynes). Innovation—encom-
passing the whole field of science, technology, and society
(STS)—is defined and determined mainly from an economic
perspective.
This perspective is in sharp contrast to the pessimistic doc-
trine of technological determinism. Jacques Ellul (1964) has
exemplified the deterministic position in his “Technological
Society” [5]. According to Ellul’s analysis technological de-
velopment is an autonomous process, governed by its own
internal rules which cannot be altered by politicians or by the
market. The process cannot be modified and shaped by any-
one’s intentional actions. 
The skepticism and pessimism of Ellul, however, is not in
line with the optimism of innovation researchers (“principle
of hope” according to the philosopher Ernst Bloch). Two
optimistic versions advocated by innovation researchers can
be distinguished. A weak version assumes that innovations
can (just) be fostered, stimulated, and supported (stimulating
assumption). This characteristic fits well into the scope of
neo-liberal or neo-classical approaches. In the strong version
of this position innovations seem to be open to planning and
controlling throughout the whole process (planning assump-
tion). This thesis is in accordance with the planning optimism
of the 1960s and with Keynes’ interventionalism. Today, the
terms “planning” and “controlling” have been replaced by
others such as “shaping”: e.g. “shaping technology, building
society”. Sometimes this understanding of innovation is said
to advocate a Marxist’s understanding of sociotechnological
development within the late historical phases (socialism,
communism): technology planned and controlled by the
working class can be viewed as being instrumental to foster-
ing social and human progress. 
However, the foregoing two positions—the weak and the
strong position—highlight the fact that underlying theories of
society are very crucial for understanding innovation. To
summarize, innovation research is intermingled with the fol-
lowing normative assumptions: 
1. Term and its connotation: The term “innovation” is
viewed positively. Normativity here means that innova-
tion researchers rarely judge any innovation negatively.
Innovation, Fagerberg states, “is crucial for long-term
economic growth.” [6] Whether a negative innovation is
an “innovation” remains an open question. Is the atom
bomb an innovation? What would a negative assessment
imply: fostering or, more than that, shaping and control-
ling innovation processes? Which actors decide what is
considered an “innovation”?
2. Progress and advancement: Innovation researchers share
a technological optimism. The phenomenon of innova-
tion (not just the term) is regarded as a central element of
progress and prosperity. Even creative destruction, a
well-known term coined by Schumpeter, is positively
highly valued as the condition for the possibility of nov-
elty. Fagerberg mentions very generally “the desirable
consequences” of innovation [7].
3. Power and relevance: Innovation is regarded as the
driving force and most influential factor of the historic
and future development of modern societies. “Without
innovation, the world in which we live would look very,
very different. ” [8] This is a normative statement rather
than a descriptive proposition. It is not based on proper
investigations of the history of the “world”; clearly de-
fined terms are missing as are empirical falsifiable hy-
potheses. Therefore, the thesis that innovation is the
driving for is either normative or—if innovation just
means change—is trivial. 
4. Stimulating and shaping: Innovation can be stimulated
and shaped. “Because of the desirable consequences,
policy makers and business leaders alike are concerned
with ways in which to foster innovation.” [9] There is no
superstructure or abstract system that prevents us from
fostering and controlling innovation processes. Innova-
tions are open to shaping procedures by actors such as
political decision makers, consumers, corporation man-
agers, and others. Technological determinism is rejected.  
5. Market and economy: Innovation is defined by success-
ful diffusion into the market and by consumer demands.
Market mechanism and commercialization determine the
innovation process. In a market system, innovations are
often private property such as patents.
The preceding is an open list that encompasses normative
assumptions most prevalent across the society/technology
boundary. This kind of normativity is not always considered
and reflected in the framework of innovation theories. How-
ever, innovation theories are interlaced with theories of late-
modern technoscientific society—in particular with visions
for societal future. A philosophical research program on in-
novation should address these broader issues; they should be
integrated into empirical innovation research.
2. OBJECT
What does innovation mean? What is the “object” or “phe-
nomenon” that shows novel properties? What is the object
being innovated? What is included in and what is excluded
from the term “innovation”? Definitions of terms—here: “in-
novation”—are not harmless and innocent. Normativity is
embodied in the term’s extension (mirroring inversely the
term’s intension). The term’s extension is not given by itself,
rather it is based on normative decisions. Is a broader or nar-
rower extension of the term adequate? What definition is
preferable—for what purpose? 
It is common to distinguish between product and process in-
novation. A highly acknowledged distinction is also that be-
tween material goods and new intangible services, and be-
tween technological and organizational innovations [10]. Let
us proceed from a narrower to a broader definition of “inno-
vation”. 
1. The ontological type of innovation focuses on products,
artifacts, material systems, objects, and entities
(technoobject innovation = “ontological dimension”).
Keith Pavitt, for example, stresses the “translation of
knowledge into working artifacts” as the central element
of innovation [11]. For Pavitt innovation always has
something to do with “technological artifacts” and with
“matching working artifacts with users’ requirement”
(ibid.). Jan Fagerberg’s examples of innovations encom-
pass technical artifacts such as “airplanes, automobiles,
telecommunications, and refrigerators, just to mention a
few of the more important innovations from the not-too-
distant past.” In addition, there is “the wheel” or “print-
ing press” [12]. Charles Edquist mentions “product inno-
vation” and also refers to “material goods” [13]. In line
with this, Keith Smith stresses “new product characteris-
tics” such as “new lift/drag aspects of an aircraft wing
[...] or improved fuel efficiency of an engine.” [14] The
foregoing shows a strong (techno)object-oriented under-
standing of innovation. 
2. The process, production or method type of innovation
refers to procedures, actions, and practices (process in-
novation = “methodological dimension”). The term “pro-
cess innovation” has been used to characterize improve-
ments in the ways of producing goods and services [15].
It differs from product innovation that focuses on the oc-
currence of new or improved goods. Good examples il-
lustrating the process and method type of innovation in
the realm of nanotechnology are the scanning tunneling
microscope (STM) and the atomic force microscope
(AFM), which stem from technological inventions in the
early 1980’s. Process innovations may be technological,
organizational, or both [16]. Alice Lam, for instance, en-
dorses “organizational innovation” [17]; by this she
means the creation of an idea and behavior new to proc-
esses and procedures of the organization. Thus, processes
of innovation can encompass technological and organ-
izational elements.
3. The knowledge or conceptual type of innovation refers to
knowledge, theories, and concepts (knowledge innova-
tion = “theoretical dimension”). This type of innovation
does not primarily focus on material objects and artifacts,
nor does it refer mainly to processes and methods. Char-
les Edquist highlights the non-material side of innovation
when he writes about “intangible kinds of innovation”
[18]. Keith Smith argues that “more generally, innova-
tion involves multidimensional novelty in aspects of
learning or knowledge organization” [19]. He regards
“knowledge creation” as the core character of innovation
[20]: Innovation means innovation of knowledge, of
concepts and theories. By advocating a non-artifactual
and non-methodological understanding of innovation
Edquist and Smith criticize that “traditionally” there has
“been a tendency to focus much on the process innova-
tions and goods”. In order to widen the perspective and
to broaden the concept of innovation Gernot Böhme and
Nico Stehr coined the term “knowledge societies” [21]
—a new field of political activity (“knowledge politics”)
is emerging in late-modern societies. In line with this
Nelson and Winter introduced the notion of the “organ-
izational memory” as a major element that determines
innovation. Patents are an example of the knowledge
type of innovation. Other examples are specific skills and
practices such as how to handle a machine, how to pro-
gram a computer, or how to use the internet. Character-
izing nanotechnology as a sciences-based “enabling
technology” highlights the knowledge type of innova-
tion.
4. In addition to these three types, we can identify and
specify a very different type of innovation (although
whether this type exists might be a contentious issue).
This type of innovation is concerned with the initial
points, the goals, problems and purposes—in other
words, it is the problem framing, problem setting and
problem perception type (problem-oriented and goal-
setting innovation). Problem-oriented innovation refers
to progress in problem perception (“realism”) or problem
construction (“constructivism”). Erich Jantsch, for in-
stance, argues in favor of a “purposive innovation sys-
tem” [22]: an explicit reflection on and revision of pur-
poses could be regarded as the highest level of innova-
tion. Jürgen Habermas also draws attention to the critical
reflection on purposes of research and innovation proc-
esses [23]. Problem seeing and research agenda setting
and the aim, volition and intention to obtain a certain
knowledge precede product-, process- and knowledge
innovation. However, this first and foundational step of
innovation is externalized by the other three foregoing
types of innovation. – Innovation might, on this broad
understanding, allow us to refer to, reflect on, and revise
societal goals and purposes. From this perspective it does
not seem appropriate that Jan Fagerberg insists we
should “leave definitions aside” and instead address the
“fundamental question for innovation research [...
namely] to explain how innovation occurs” [24]. Norma-
tivity, as the term is used here, refers to the guiding
ideas, goals, objectives and purposes. Innovation is
linked to a reflexive questioning of what is given in order
to improve goals and objectives. Reflecting normativity
means posing questions such as: what for and for what?
What is the purpose and the goal? Is the purpose “inno-
vative”?—Required is knowing-what and knowing-
where-to (quo vadis), instead of (just) knowing-why.
This is, indeed, a broad perspective on innovation that is
close to well-known procedures of prospective technol-
ogy assessment (PTA).
The extension of the term “innovation” is not given (by itself
or by any empirical approach). Rather, it is based on norma-
tive decisions about what objects/phenomena should be in-
cluded: term definitions and word understandings are always
crucial for the constitution (and construction) of research
fields. A broader definition encompasses knowledge and
problem innovation, a narrower perspective exclusively refers
to material artifacts and processes.
3. PROCESS 
How can we describe the innovation process? An immediate
normative issue is that innovation is, by definition, based on
novelty. Innovation is the creation of something qualitatively
new. A fundamental definitional issue concerns what is meant
by “novelty”. We know from self-organization theory in
physics that novelty is hard to define—it is a matter of ongo-
ing dispute. Normative criteria to qualify and quantify nov-
elty are indispensable; problems of comparability and incom-
parability, of commensurability and incommensurability
emerge. In addition, novelty seems to be a multidimensional
property and a (time-dependent) process phenomenon. Ac-
cording to Keith Smith, “as with ‘research’, innovation is a
multidimensional process, with nothing clearly measurable
about many aspects of the underlying process.” [25]ii
In spite of the lack of a unified theory of innovation we can at
least identify common conceptual elements in most of the
models of innovation, e.g., the (modified) pull-push models,
the evolutionary models, and the actor-network models. Ac-
cording to Keith Pavitt, the innovation process consists of
three (in fact of six detailed) subprocesses which are non-
linear interacting, non-deterministic, time-dependent, and
non-disjunct overlapping [26]. By taking feedback loops on
different time scales into account Pavitt modifies the classic
causal-chain model of innovation that was highly disputed
[27]. Pavitt argues that although innovation processes in dif-
ferent sectors differ strongly, we can observe a common
structure. Based on Pavitt’s analytic distinctions we can iden-
tify in any subprocess normative elements: in fact, normative
criteria specify and qualify these subprocesses. Normativity is
indispensable for the development of any concept of innova-
tion.
1. The production of scientific-technological knowledge:
This process encompasses basic scientific research and,
based on this, technological inventions. Normative crite-
ria such as “truth” for characterizing scientific discover-
ies and “novelty” for specifying technological inventions
are involved. In particular, invention means the first oc-
currence of an idea for a new product or process. How-
ever, novelty is not given by itself but is an outer ascrip-
tion. Normative criteria have to be formulated: an idea is
considered to be “new” in comparison to others. – For
this subprocess the contributions of natural and engi-
neering science are of major importance. Most scientists
argue that innovation is equivalent to, or at least mainly
based on, scientific-technological knowledge. This posi-
tion is well known as the science and technology push
view of innovation. Scientific knowledge seems to de-
termine downstream the whole process of innovation.
However, whether or not the term “innovation” does, or
should, refer primarily to scientific discoveries and in-
ventions is highly disputed. Many scholars contend that
Fig. 1. The modified chain-model of innovation.
Normative criteria specify different subprocesses
we should draw a clear line between (scientific-
technological) invention and (societal/economic/public
acceptable) innovation [28].
2. The translation and transformation processes of tech-
noscientific knowledge into working artifacts: Most in-
novation researchers stress a general knowledge-
transformation process. Therefore, “truth” and “novelty”
are necessary, but not sufficient as adequate normative
criteria for innovation. Most important are others, such as
“better” and “more”. Therefore, innovation is mainly
considered to be a transformative process: innovation (in
a more restricted understanding: “better”), and manu-
facturing / construction / production (“more”). This
transformation process is truly very interdisciplinary as it
involves engineering sciences as well as certain social
sciences such as economics.
3. The response to and influence by market demands and
societal needs: Traditionally, this process was called dif-
fusion, distribution, consumption, or use. Normative cri-
teria to specify this process are “broad acceptance”, “so-
cietal impact”, “economic success”, and “ethical accapt-
ability”. The process does not only encompass consum-
ers’ responses, but also the influence and power of the
market mechanism on technological development (up-
stream, pull view). This is the domain of social scientists,
in particular of sociologists and economists. Christopher
Freeman, for instance, talks about the “economics of in-
dustrial innovation” and he highlights the relevance of an
approach from economics [29]. “Innovation and diffu-
sion” and “diffusion of innovations” is a major topic of
innovation research in the social sciences.
Without the normative criteria (truth, novelty, better, more,
...) a concept/theory of innovation is impossible. While the
normative criteria themselves are not open to empirical in-
vestigations, they form an indispensable prerequisite for any
empirical analysis. In order to justify the criteria, analytic
clarification and rational argumentation are necessary.    
Not only do the normative criteria within the three subproc-
esses of innovation differ, but disciplinary scholars also
highlight different subprocesses. From the perspective of dif-
ferent disciplines, different aspects of innovation are consid-
ered more or less important. (a) Natural and engineering sci-
entists tend to stress the first subprocess—the production of
scientific-technological knowledge—and (b) social scientists
mainly highlight the last point—the diffusion, the response to
and influence by market demands and societal needs. Thus,
any assessment of the relevance of the subprocesses of inno-
vation seems to depend essentially on disciplinary prefer-
ences. Disciplinary norms determine any understanding of
innovation. So natural and engineering scientists tend to as-
sume that the innovation process is based on a science (tech-
nology) push, whereas social scientists frequently endorse a
societal demand pull (“finalization”). Interdisciplinarity is
hard to achieve.iii 
It is interesting to note that the field today is dominated by
social scientists—and by a social constructivist view of inno-
vation / technology. We find a devaluation of the science
push view and, interlaced with this, (a) a disregard for the
theoretical advancements and the explanatory power of sci-
ences as well as the internal structure of technology and (b) a
devaluation of any critical materialist position. Of course, the
science push view is naive in that it overestimates the rele-
vance of basic research for society. In addition, it is an ex-
pertocratic mode of problem solving. It is not open to public
decision making and participatory governance. – The deficits
of the science push view are obvious. However, the crucial
question is whether today’s dominant view, which is pull
oriented and interlaced with evolutionary-, actor-network-
and/or case study approaches, will permit us to reflect on the
real and problematic power of (natural and engineering) sci-
ences and of (technoscience-based) material artifacts in soci-
ety. Innovation researchers seem hesitant to open Pandora’s
box of the dynamics of science and technology, and of mate-
rial entities.
Let us look at an example illustrating the disregard of inno-
vation researchers for the theoretical advancements of (natu-
ral and engineering) sciences. Jan Fagerberg misinterprets the
history of science when he writes: “Although Leonardo da
Vinci is reported to have had some quite advanced ideas for a
flying machine, these were impossible to carry out in practice
due to a lack of adequate materials, production skills, and—
above all—a power source.” [30] Fagerberg’s statement is
misleading because not only were adequate materials and
production skills not present at that time, but, more impor-
tantly, Leonardo’s concept was erroneous. Leonardo’s flying
machine would never have been constructed. The theories of
physics in the 19th century were necessary, in particular aero-
and hydrodynamics, fluid mechanics, and in addition the
boundary layer theory that Prantl developed in 1904 (as part
of the new engineering sciences). This example shows that in
order to understand innovation processes, just focussing on
the social sphere (and considering the social construction of
technology) is not sufficient. A in-depth knowledge of sci-
ence and technology is necessary. 
An influential paper that reveals (at least implicitly) how
normativity and strategic arguments are linked with innova-
tion concepts was presented by Stephen Kline and Nathan
Rosenberg in 1986. Kline and Rosenberg argue against what
they call “the linear model of innovation” [31]. Although  the
linear model was a widely accepted interpretation of innova-
tion at that time, Kline and Rosenberg show convincingly that
this is an erroneous view: according to them, the objective of
the model was not to describe the innovation process but to
provide arguments for the relevance of basic research and
natural science. Its objective was to defend the interests of
researchers, scientists, and engineers. The linear model as-
sumes misleadingly (1) that innovation is a kind of applied
science. Sciences and scientific inventions were considered to
be the important bottleneck. (2) Further, the linear model is
based on an assumption of causality and could easily be used
as an argument in favor of  technological determinism. Tech-
nological determinism seems to be erroneous, too. This posi-
tion is not open to public deliberation processes. (3) The lin-
ear model fails to reflect economic and societal demands—in
particular the driving power of economy. (4) Temporal ef-
fects, different sectoral time scales and nonlinear feedback
are not considered.iv – An important implicit finding from the
paper of Kline and Rosenberg is that innovation concepts are
often linked to disciplinary convictions and claims. Innova-
tion concepts can be used and misused as strategic arguments
in order to pursue particulate interests of disciplines.  
The preceding ideas were articulated by referring to Richard
Nelson’s and Sidney Winter’s “Theory of economic change”
[32]. This book was tremendously important for innovation
research and for the concept of evolutionary models. Nelson
and Winter share the Schumpeterian view of “capitalism as
an engine of change.” However, today we may ask whether
innovation theorists really perceive and reflect on (?) the real
power of material artifacts or not. This specific point was
highlighted in the epoch-making critique “Do Artifacts have
Politics?” raised by Langdon Winner: “Technological inno-
vations are similar to legislative acts or political foundings
that establish a framework for public order that will endure
over many generations.” [33] In general, terms such as
“knowledge-based firms”, “technological regime”, “industrial
dynamics”, and “organizational memory” coined by Nelson
and Winter seem to be far too week to reflect on and to revise
the sociotechnical power of material artifacts.v Friedrich En-
gels wrote in his essay “On Authority” in 1872: “The auto-
matic machinery of a big factory is much more despotic than
the small capitalists who employ workers ever have been.”
[34] Lewis Mumford identified two traditions of technology –
one authoritarian, the other democratic [35]. Material artifacts
have embodied power. This is not (just) a social construction
but a material-artifactual real construction! 
Langdon Winner criticizes his colleagues stating that “we
immediately reduce everything to the interplay of social
forces.” [36] Most innovation researchers do not regard inno-
vation processes from the materialist’s but from the construc-
tivist’s perspective. From this perspective, the process of in-
novation seems to be widely open to shaping procedures.
Openness to shaping is, indeed, a normative assumption and
not an empirical result. This optimistic viewpoint underesti-
mates the real power of materialized (or institutionalized)
innovations: “the normative power of the factual existing”
(Horkheimer/Adorno [37]). An initial point for a prospective
critical assessment of innovation processes is to acknowledge
the shaping problems and the (innovation-internal) resistance
against shaping attempts.vi Thus, some analytic ideas of criti-
cal theory (encompassing a critique of political economy)
seem to be indispensable for present-day prospective-oriented
and reflexive innovation research. 
4. ETHICS 
Innovation theories are relevant for ethics, in particular for
engineering ethics. Nonetheless, neither ethicists nor innova-
tion researchers have perceived and acknowledged that inno-
vation theories are indispensable to localize, to reflect on, and
to revise engineering action in society. 
Engineering ethics refers to engineer’s practice; it is contex-
tualistic rather than universalistic. It is not solely concerned
with universal principles, rational argumentation, and inter-
subjective justification (theory of ethics, argumentation the-
ory). The conceptual challenge is that engineering ethics is
context dependent in the sense that the analysis and diagnosis
of the situation determines the decision making and the action
taking. So, from a philosophical perspective, engineering
ethics is based on action theory. – Action theory, however,
should be interlaced with innovation theories in order to be in
touch with the societal situation and the problem that is at
stake. Implicitly, most textbooks on engineering ethics ac-
knowledge that action theory and innovation theory play an
important role. However, all this is not reflected explicitly—
in particular, an integration of innovation theory is missing.
Referring to innovation theory, at least four positions con-
cerning the “innovation-engineering-ethics intersection” can
be distinguished:
(a) If we presuppose technological determinism, ethics does
not have a chance impact on the innovation process. 
(b) If we argue for a push view of innovation, science ethics
is most important. 
(c) On the other hand, if we assume a demand pull under-
standing of innovation, social and political ethics are
most relevant.
(d) In between we may find engineering ethics. It has to ex-
plicitly reflect on and mediate between the other extreme
positions in order to find a realistic approach to engi-
neering action.
If we apply the dominant view of innovation researchers
(demand pull view), it follows that scientists and research
engineers are not generally responsible for their action in
society. Engineering actions seem to be just one minor factor
in the whole innovation process. Most important are the mar-
ket dynamics, the manager’s action, the organizational struc-
tures, the customer’s behavior, the public governance. Hence,
innovation theory has consequences for applied ethics. 
Besides the various versions of the pull-push models of inno-
vation, other models such as evolutionary or actor-network
models can also serve as a reference frame for localizing
ethical action. When considering an evolutionary approach
we can say that a kind of nomological law-like machine
seems to govern this kind of innovation process—a machine
that operates very similarly to processes of self-organization
in natural sciences. Evolutionary approaches are—similar to
technological determinism—not open to ethical considera-
tions. In addition, actor-network models are of some interest.
On the one hand, responsibility might be dissolved within the
structures of the net and on the other hand, everybody has—
because of global interactions and various “butterfly
effects”—a tremendous impact on the whole.
Innovation theories can serve as an excellent guideline to
identify and localize engineering responsibility. Insofar as
ethics is a normative subdiscipline, innovation theories are
interlaced with ethical-normative consequences as well as
with prerequisites. Taking this into account, we should stress
that engineering ethics (as a theoretical discipline) encom-
passes not only theory of ethics/moral and argumentation
theory, but in addition: action theory and innovation theory.
SUMMARY
Four types of normativity can be identified in innovation
concepts: normativity with regard (a) to society/theories of
society, (b) to objects of innovation, (c) to the process of in-
novation, and (d) to ethics. – Innovation can be characterized
as an eminently political term. The term is a cognitive bound-
ary object located in a transfer zone between academia and
politics. What “innovation” is cannot be separated from what
it should be. The term “innovation” is descriptive and norma-
tive at the same time. In order to shape innovation processes
towards our common future it seems worthwhile to consider,
to reflect on and to revise the normativity of innovation. 
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i Such identification was doubted from the 1960’s until the middle of
the 1990’s, but evidently just for this short episode. In the 1990’s,
concepts of innovation replaced more reflexive and critical con-
siderations, as brought to light in works such as The Silent Spring,
The Limits of Growth, The World Risk Society, and Normal Acci-
dents. Late-modern problem orientation was repressed by the re-
vived classical-modern technology orientation. The technological
optimism of the Baconian Project seems to be back.
ii However, there are indicators that try to quantify some aspects of
the innovation process: (1) R&D data, (2) data on patents, patent
applications and grants, (3) bibliometric data. In addition to these
well-established measurements there are others (Smith 2005,
152): (4) technometric indicators, (5) synthetic indictors (parallel
to consultant indicators), (6) specific indicators (such as firm da-
tabases, ...). Of course, the indicators specify some important as-
pects of innovation. However, we have to guard against believing
that one of them is the basic indicator characterizing the innova-
tion. The major difference between innovation measurement on
the one hand and measurements in the realm of classical Newto-
nian mechanics on the other hand still remains ...
                                                                                                   
iii We find, more or less, a “science war” concerning the appropriate
understanding of innovation. This kind of science war differs, of
course, from that between constructivists and realists.
iv Contrary to the linear model, innovation is regarded as a learning
process involving multiple inputs on various scales. Kline and
Rosenberg advocated what is called the chain-link model of inno-
vation (Smith 2005, 150).
v In a similar vein one can mention the expression “national system
of innovation” (NSI) that was highlighted by Freeman (1987).
Freeman defined it as “the network of institutions in public or pri-
vate sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, and
diffuse new technologies.” (Freeman 1987, 1) Two other impor-
tant books on the national systems of innovation are by Lundvall
(1992) and Nelson (1993). Whereas Nelson’s approach is case
study oriented, Lundvall emphasizes the need for a theoretical ap-
proach. He seeks to develop an alternative to the neo-classical
tradition in economics by placing innovation at the center of the
analysis: innovation cannot only be fostered, but in addition it can
be shaped deliberately. The systems-of-innovation approach
adopts a holistic, non-linear, and—as many authors stress—“in-
terdisciplinary perspective.” (Edquist 2005, 185) The systems ap-
proach primarily emphasizes common learning processes.—Ed-
quist describes the “systems of innovation” by focusing on or-
ganizations and institutions (Edquist 2005, 182). The systems of
innovation are the main determinants of innovation processes.
According to Edquist the determinants encompass “all important
economic, social, political, organizational, institutional, and other
factors that influence the development, diffusion, and use of inno-
vation.” (ibid.) In line with this, Keith Smith, referring to Rosen-
berg and Kline, argues in favor of “the importance of non-R&D
inputs to innovation.” He mentions “training”, “design activities”
and the “exploration of markets for new products” (Smith 2005,
150).
vi The real power of innovations (artifacts, processes, and knowl-
edge) in society and the closeness to (public policy) shaping  of
many innovation processes has to be noticed to enable a cri-
tique—this is different from just being aware of the path depend-
ency of technological development.
